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Emissions trading is a form of environmental regulation in which a regulatory body specifies the
total allowable discharge of pollutants, divides this cap into individual permits assigned to
individual polluters, and allows trading of the resulting permits.  Laboratory experiments, in which
paid subjects participate in controlled markets, can be used to test both proposals for emission
trading and the theories on which they are based.  This paper surveys the laboratory research that
has investigated the efficiency of emission trading programs, role of alternative instruments and
institutions, the effects of allowing firms to carry inventories of permits, and the extent to which
market power can be exercised.1
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INTRODUCTION
In the past thirty years, the concept of emissions trading has grown from a theoretical curiosity to a
central idea in environmental regulation. The theory is well developed (Tietenberg, 1985, 1992)
and case studies and summaries of actual practice are available widely (Hahn, 1989; Tietenberg,
1992).  Attention has shifted from whether tradable emissions schemes should be implemented to
how they should be implemented.  This shift brings with it a need to examine closely details which
may have been hidden in a broad overview but which need careful attention when designing and
implementing emissions trading plans where millions of dollars are at stake.  
This paper is concerned with one particular aspect of mechanism design: the use of
laboratory techniques to testbed proposed market institutions and to test the theories on which the
emission trading programs are based.  Laboratory experimentation is a relatively new field in
economics, but it is receiving greater acceptance both as a method for testing theories and a way of2
examining the performance of proposed market institutions before implementing them in the field 
(Smith and Williams, 1992;  Davis and Holt, 1993).
A significant number of experiments related to emission trading have been reported over
the past decade, and especially in the last five years.   These experiments have taken place at many
institutions in the United States and in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at McMaster
University in Canada.  This paper summarizes the results of the experiments with particular
attention to what contribution they can make to rational policy formation.  The paper begins with a
brief overview of the experiments and continues to examine their findings in more detail.  Evidence
from laboratory markets will be presented to establish  four points.  First, emission permit markets
tend to capture some but not all of the potential gains from trade in responsibilities for pollution
control.  Second, the market institutions governing trade in emission permit markets will have a
significant effect on their efficiency.  Third, the design features of emission permit markets, such as
whether or not permits may be banked or whether or not time streams of permits may be traded,
affect their performance.  Last, concern about market power in emissions trading markets should
not be dismissed lightly.
THE NATURE OF LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS
A laboratory experiment in economics is conducted with human subjects, usually university
undergraduates.  Typically about eight to twelve subjects are recruited for each market session.  At
the beginning of each session, participants are instructed about the rules of the experiment and
assigned roles as buyers, sellers or traders.  Usually they are told they will be participating in a
market for an abstract product called a token.   Buyers are given a schedule indicating the3
redemption value to them of one, two, or more tokens in each period.  For example the first token
may be redeemed for 100 lab dollars, the second for 50 lab dollars, the third for 45 lab dollars, and
so on.  The buyer’s profit on each token is the difference between its redemption value and the
price actually paid to the seller.  Sellers are given marginal cost schedules indicating what each
token they sell costs them.  They compute their profit as the difference between the selling price
and the marginal cost of the token.  
Trading occurs for a number of market periods under rules specified by the experimenter. 
Trading may be done orally with manual record keeping or it may be mediated by computer
programs of varying complexity and sophistication.  In most of the experiments reported here,
subjects entered bids and offers for tokens at a computer terminal.  At the end of the experiment,
subjects’ earnings are converted from lab dollars to local currencies at a previously announced
exchange rate and the subjects are paid in cash.  A typical undergraduate may earn about $30 for a
two-hour session.
One cardinal principle in experimental economics is to pay subjects sufficiently well to
ensure their decisions are motivated by market payoffs.  This is one reason for using university
students as subjects; the opportunity cost of employed adults, especially senior decision makers,
would be much higher.  A second cardinal principle is never to deceive the subjects.  All the rules
of the experiment are announced in advance and strictly followed.  Our interpretation of the data,
however, may be different from the subjects’.  For example, subjects are not told that the tokens
they are trading represent permits to emit pollutants.  In this way we hope to avoid biases induced
by the nature of the commodity being traded.4
EMISSIONS TRADING EXPERIMENTS
Plott 
Plott (1983) reported the first laboratory experiment directly related to emissions trading.  One of
the questions Plott addressed was “how do the pollution tax, pollution standard, and pollution
licenses compare as methods for correcting [an] externality?”  Plott created a market for a product
which conferred benefits on consumers who purchased the product, but also imposed spillover
costs on all individuals in the market.  The spillover costs were related to the number of units
produced by the industry and were realized by buyers and sellers alike, regardless of how many
units of the product they individually produced or consumed.  Plott demonstrated that this
externality could not be internalized by the double-auction pricing institution.  Into this
environment he introduced three alternative mechanisms to correct the market failure.  When
permits were used, the optimal number of permits were distributed among buyers and sellers of the
product.  Two double-auction markets operated simultaneously.  Producers of the product had to
acquire a permit before selling a unit of the product.  Although the optimal theoretical distribution
of permits and the optimal allocation of final product among consumers could easily be determined
from the parameters underlying the laboratory environment, it was not obvious that this optimal
distribution of permits and allocation of final product would emerge behaviourally when the
permit mechanism was introduced into the laboratory.  Plott’s results were very impressive.  The
product market and permit market prices and quantities generally converged to, or very close to,
the competitive equilibrium values.  Participants in these markets realized on average more than 95
percent of the gains from using permits to regulate production.  In the absence of the permit5
market net losses were realized by participants in this product market.  Plott’s laboratory sessions
provided strong support for permit trading as a feasible mechanism for correcting externality
problems such as pollution emission.
Hahn
Hahn (1988) tested his earlier proposal for a revenue neutral auction of emission permits (Hahn
and Noll, 1982). One objection to emissions trading as originally proposed by Dales (1968) and
others was that auctioning of emission permits by governments would both increase government
revenues (a possibility viewed negatively by some) and impose a heavy financial burden on
polluting industries.  Hahn and Noll had proposed a revenue neutral auction in which current
emissions would be grandfathered by distributing free permits to current polluters, but a market
would be created by forcing the recipients to offer the permits for sale in a sealed bid auction.  A
market clearing price would be determined by aggregating all bids and offers and revenues from
the auction would be redistributed to the firms offering permits for sale.  Firms could retain their
grandfathered permits by bidding a high value for them.  This would be without financial
consequence because they would in effect be buying the permits from themselves. 
Hahn ran a series of seven experimental sessions using varying parameters.  In six of the
seven cases trading improved the efficiency of the market.  Prices, however, did not always
converge to the predicted values.
Several aspects of Hahn’s research design were unsatisfactory.  Most obviously, he did not
run repeated trials of any of his experimental settings, so that the statistical significance of his
various treatments cannot be gauged.  His trading method, which involved collection of quantities6
offered at 10 prespecified prices may also have influenced his results.  Nevertheless, Hahn’s
experiment represented a significant step in the direction of testbedding proposed emissions trading
institutions in the laboratory.
U.S. Department of Energy Experiments
The U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which eventually led to the well-known
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) auction in sulphur dioxide emission allowances (the
EPA’s word for permits), provided an opportunity for further laboratory research into the
properties of the revenue neutral auction. The U.S. Department of Energy first commissioned
studies at the Universities of Arizona and Colorado and later followed them up with a systematic
replication study at the Universities of Southern California and Mississippi.  All of these studies
have focussed heavily on the institutional features found in the U.S. sulphur dioxide emission
permit program, in particular the revenue neutral auction, the reduction in the number of permits
available to potential users, and the opportunity for banking permits.
Franciosi, Isaac, Pingry, and Reynolds
Franciosi et al. (1992) extended the Hahn experiment in a more conventional laboratory
environment at the University of Arizona.   They compared the performance of revenue neutral
auctions with uniform price auctions in which revenues from the sale of permits were not
redistributed to the subjects.
1  The prices and efficiencies generated in the revenue neutral markets
and uniform price markets were quite similar, although substantial overbidding on infra-marginal
units occurred in some of the revenue neutral cases.7
The Arizona research group extended their examination of the revenue neutral auction in
Franciosi et al. (1998). This experiment focussed on the interaction of the official revenue neutral
auction market with a private, less regulated market for permits which was expected to develop
beside the EPA auction.  In this experiment each period is divided into two markets, conducted
sequentially.  In the first, subjects trade permits in a double auction market similar to a
conventional asset market (such as the Toronto Stock Exchange).  Subjects submit bids (offers to
buy at a specified price), asks (offers to sell), or acceptances at a computer terminal.  At the end of
the double auction, subjects are required to surrender a fraction of their holdings to a revenue
neutral permit auction.  This auction is conducted as a sealed bid auction in which the traders
effectively submit their entire demand schedule for permits and a market clearing price is
determined by the intersection of the this demand curve with the fixed supply.  
Eleven sessions were run, four with banking, four without, and three with banking and the
Colorado parameters used by Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse (see below). They found a divergence
in prices between the revenue neutral auction and the double auction.  They also found that
subjects are unable to exploit banking opportunities to increase efficiency.
Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse
Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse (1998) presented the results of  a related experiment conducted at the
University of Colorado. Their design focused primarily on the issue of banking.  The Colorado
subjects were told to allocate their permits over current and future periods, on the understanding
that their production costs would vary with the number of permits used.  Subjects were trained in a
banking-only environment and then introduced to a revenue neutral auction in which they8
effectively submitted a demand or supply schedule for permits.  The computer monitoring the
experiment computed a market clearing price and enforced the implied trades.  In contrast to
Franciosi et al. (1998), who compared market equilibria with and without banking, Cronshaw and
Brown-Kruse compared banking equilibria with and without trading. They found that market
trading allowed subjects to improve over a banking-only equilibrium.
Cason, Elliott, and Van Boening
Cason et al. (1998) discuss a further study undertaken to reproduce the efficiency results and to
reconcile the banking results of the two earlier studies by Franciosi et al. (1998) and Cronshaw and
Brown-Kruse.  They also investigate the opportunities for speculation opened up by the finding in
the second paper by Franciosi et al. (1998) of a divergence between prices in the revenue neutral
auction and the double auction.  
Cason et al. investigate first whether the divergence between the Franciosi et al. (1998)
and the Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse results reflect site-specific differences in performance rather
than differences in experimental design and second whether opportunities for profitable speculation
exist between periods and between the revenue neutral and private markets.  They conduct a
laboratory experiment in which there are four types of firm (high emissions/high abatement cost,
low emissions/high abatement cost, high emissions/low abatment cost, and low emissions/low
abatement cost).  Subjects sequentially trade in a double auction and a revenue neutral call auction
in each of twelve periods.  There is a 50% reduction in permits allocated after the sixth period. The
key treatment variable is location of the session: eight sessions were undertaken at each of the
University of Mississippi and the University of Southern California.9
The authors find efficiencies of 30.6% over all sessions, with no difference between mean
values at the two sites.
2  These results are comparable to the efficiencies reported by Franciosi et
al. (1998).  The low efficiencies are associated with under-banking in earlier periods together with
correspondingly low prices in early periods and high prices in late periods. This underbanking is
consistent with earlier evidence of underbanking found using the same computerized environment
and may be due to a serious bias induced by the presentation of data in it.
3
The authors test for speculative opportunities by looking for systematic deviations from
perfect foresight competitive equilibrium prices in the case of intertemporal speculation and
statistically significant differences in mean prices by period in the double auction and the revenue
neutral auction.  They find that deviations from perfect foresight competitive equilibrium price are
negatively related to deviations from optimal banking, both in early and late periods and conclude
that speculative opportunities were indeed present.  They also conclude that there were speculative
opportunities present within the earlier periods, because there is a statistically significant difference




Cason (1993, 1995) observes that the EPA auction is a discriminative price auction in which sellers
with the lowest asking prices are matched with the buyers with the highest bids.  He proceeds to
demonstrate that the auction rules induce sellers to choose asking prices for permits which under-
value their cost of emission control.  Given the number of buyers, increasing the number of sellers10
increases the extend of under-valuation.  The biased price signals which theory suggests will
emerge in this market may reduce the efficiency of the market.  Cason (1995) proceeds to
demonstrate this bias in a laboratory market.  These sessions suggest the EPA auction may be
seriously flawed.
Cason and Plott
Cason and Plott (1996) report an experiment consisting of 12 sessions comparing the performance
of the EPA style revenue neutral auction with the more conventional uniform price auction
employed in many financial markets.  Cason (1993) had pointed out that the EPA market contains
important incentives for sellers to understate their true valuation of permits.  This should lead to
lower prices and efficiencies than might be obtained in a market with fewer biases.  Cason and
Plott find that the uniform price auction is more efficient, induces more truthful revelation of
traders costs and values, generates more accurate price information, and is more responsive to
changing market conditions than is the EPA style auction.  The EPA style auction leads to lower
clearing prices which in turn suggest the marginal abatement cost is lower than its true value.
Carlson and Sholtz
Carlson and Sholtz (1994) report an experiment undertaken at the California Institute of
Technology which addressed the relationship between intertemporal trading opportunities in
permits and the price stability of emissions markets.  Uncertainty was introduced  into a laboratory
market by randomly adjusting the buyers’ demands for permits.  Two laboratory sessions were
conducted.  The first demonstrated there was a strong tendency for the prices of permits to
become unstable when the demand for permits is uncertain and no banking is allowed.  The second11
showed that a scheme of overlapping expiry dates on pollution permits could overcome this
instability.
Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore
Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994) extend the work of Franciosi et al. (1992a) by comparing the
performance of the revenue neutral auction against the double auction.  This is done in both
competitive environments (five buyers and five sellers) and monopoly environments (one seller and
five buyers).  Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore find that the double auction performs better than the
revenue neutral auction in both competitive and monopoly environments.  The introduction of
market power into the revenue neutral environment, however, does not lead to a great a reduction
in market efficiencies as it does in the double-auction environment.   In the competitive
environment, prices adjust to the competitive equilibrium with both market institutions, but
adjustment is much slower in the revenue-neutral market.
McMaster Experiments
A substantial program of laboratory research into tradable emission permits is underway at the
McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory.  Three major experiments have been undertaken.  
Mestelman, Moir, and Muller
Mestelman et al. (1998) and Muller and Mestelman (1993, 1994) report the outcomes of
laboratory sessions which testbed proposals for nitrous oxide trading in southern Ontario (Nichols
and Harrison, 1990a, 1990b; Nichols, 1992).  The proposed institution differed from the U.S. EPA
auction in a number of respects, notably the presence of two trading instruments, shares and
permits, and the absence of a mandated auction with compulsory offers.
4  This experiment12
(hereafter identified as ET1) implemented trading for shares and permits in a multiple unit, open
outcry, free-form market while using the Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse redemption values so as to
allow comparison with the work by Franciosi et al. (1998) and Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse.  This
market structure was similar to open-pit trading for commodities but also provided traders with the
opportunity to withdraw from the pit to negotiate private contracts.  Contract prices were not
made public systematically, and so price and quantity information was incomplete at best.  ET1
demonstrated that an emission trading scheme such as the one described by Nichols and Harrison
could effectively reduce abatement costs for a given emission cap.  Banking was effective, but
permit prices did not reflect system marginal abatement costs. 
Godby, Mestelman, Muller, and Welland
Godby et al. (1997, hereafter ET3) was a large scale systematic test of the effects of bankable
permits, tradable shares and uncertainty in a 2x2x2 factorial design.   Trading was conducted in
computer mediated double auction.  This experiment confirmed the presence of price spikes in
uncertain environments without banking and the ability of banking to eliminate the price
instablility.  It also revealed a significant impact on market efficiency through the interaction of
banking and trading shares.  The double-auction institution yielded permit prices that more closely
reflected system marginal abatement costs than did the less organized market of ET1.
Brown-Kruse, Elliott, and Godby
Brown-Kruse et al. (1995, hereafter ETC) undertook  an investigation into the potential for
market power in emissions trading markets.  The experiment consisted of twelve replications of a
design originally proposed and piloted by Brown-Kruse and Elliott (1990).  It involved groups of13
eleven subjects, one in the role of  the dominant firm in an emission trading market and the others
in the role of competitive fringe firms.  Treatment variables were the initial allocation of permits
(100% to dominant firm or fringe) and possibilities for manipulating a downstream product
market.   ETC displays striking results which suggest that market power can easily emerge in the
presence of asymmetric information (when the dominant firm has information about the valuations
of the competitive fringe).
THE FINDINGS
Overall, the experiments described above support several conclusions, which are reported below
together with illustrative evidence.
Markets Work
Emissions trading markets work.  Except for the market power experiments, all the reported
experiments found increases in efficiency over the initial allocation. Moreover, prices in double
auctions, revenue-neutral auctions, and uniform-price auctions tend to approximate the
competitive prediction.  Adjustment to these prices, however, may proceed differently for different
institutions.
Table 1 presents efficiency results for the five studies which implemented a reduction in the
emission permit cap during the laboratory session.  Although trader characteristics and trading
institutions differ across many of the sessions, on average each  of the laboratory environments
shows a reduction in abatement cost relative to what would be incurred under a command-and-
control regime.  In some environments the cost savings are nearly 90 percent of the potential14
savings (ET3), while in others the savings are slightly more than 25 percent of the potential.  In all
of the environments the system emission cap is maintained at the command-and-control level.
Figure 1 displays the contract prices generated in two ET3 sessions.  In Panel A permits are
traded, but banking is not permitted.  The competitive price is 14 laboratory dollars during the first
4 periods, but increases to something between 123 and 136 during the final 8 periods.  The price
increase is the result of the reduction in permits following the crank-down of the emission cap. 
Note how well the prices generated by a double auction market with 8 traders converge to the
price predicted by the competitive model.  When banking is permitted, the price predicted by the
competitive model is something between 72 and 78 laboratory dollars.  The price path in Panel B is
generated by a session in which permits may be traded as may entitlements to future permits
(shares).  This is relatively stable over the twelve trading periods in spite of the crank-down in
permits after period 4.  This is a dramatic example of the power of competitive markets to
generate signals which will exhaust gains from trade (the efficiency of the market in Panel A, over
the 12 periods, was 98 percent; in Panel B, it was 97 percent).
Market Institutions Matter
Low price incentives in the EPA auction
Market institutions affect market outcomes.  Cason and Plott argue that the EPA auction
rules bias both bids and asks downwards, and show that these results can be obtained behaviourally
in a controlled market environment.  Because the lowest ranked bid is matched with the highest
offer, sellers have an incentive to ask a low price for further permits.  Similarly, buyers have no



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2 illustrates Cason’s and Plott’s results.  The dotted lines show the true marginal
valuations for buyers and sellers.  The dark lines connecting circles and boxes show actual bids and
asks respectively (filled circles and boxes are bids and asks which were filled).  At the beginning of
the experiment, buyers and sellers are bidding close to their marginal values.  By period 3,
however, the sellers are asking prices well below their costs and the buyers are bidding well below
their valuations.  By period 9, sellers are asking zero and buyers are bidding at or below the
competitive price.  On average, prices are below the marginal cost of abatement for the industry18
represented by this market.
Alternatives to the EPA Auction
Although the incentives built into the EPA auction may lead to behaviour which is not demand
revealing and which results in lower than desirable prices, Cason and Plott provide evidence of an
alternative trading institution with more desirable properties.  Figure 3 shows periods 9, 10, and 11
from a session run under the laboratory EPA auction rules and periods 9, 10, and 11 from a session
run under a uniform-price auction with the same parameters as the EPA auction.  Notice how19
closely the bids and asks in the uniform-price auction track the actual valuations and costs, while in
the EPA auction the bids and asks have fallen well below the respective valuations.  There are
other alternatives to the EPA auction than the uniform-price auction.  None has been evaluated in a
laboratory setting in the way Cason and Plott conducted their evaluation.
Another indication of the importance of institutions is shown in Table 1.  The abatement
cost schedules and permit allocations are the same for the traders in the ET1, Franciosi et al.
(1998), and Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse.  Permits may be traded and banked.  The sessions lasted
for 12 periods and the permit allocations were cranked down after period 4 in all cases.  The
trading institutions (described earlier) were very different.  The performance of the trading
schemes, as reflected by the abatement cost savings are also very different.  Institutions clearly
matter.
Design Features Matter
The abilities to trade shares and to bank permits have important and independent effects on permit
markets.  Moreover, these features interact with the degree of certainty about permit use.
Tradable Shares
Many Canadian proposals for emission trading have included formal trading in shares.  A share is
the right to receive a fixed percentage of the annual allowable emissions in the current and all
future years.  The McMaster experiments (ET1 and ET3) have shown that markets with tradable20
shares have less permit trading but a more rapid convergence of price to equilibrium levels than
markets which exclude futures trading.
Table 2 presents the average permit volume per session in ET3 in each of different
treatments.  Whether the production of emissions is certain or uncertain or whether permits may be
banked or not, the existence of share trading during a session leads to fewer permits being traded.
Figure 4 shows contract prices for two ET3 sessions.  Banking is not allowed in either
session, but in the session displayed in Panel B, shares are traded.  In Panel A prices do not reach
the upper equilibrium band until the end of the ninth trading period.  In Panel B, prices are in the
upper consistently by the seventh period.  The frequency of the contracts is consistent with the
mean trades reported in Table 2.  Trades are fewer when shares are traded, and convergence is
more rapid.
TABLE 2     MEAN PERMIT VOLUME IN 12 PERIODS IN ET3 SESSIONS
Certain Production Uncertain Production
No Share
Trading
Share Trading No Share
Trading
Share Trading
No Banking 211.33 59.33 218.00 96.33
Banking 184.67 96.67 226.67 119.67
Source: Godby, Mestelman, Muller, and Welland (1996)21
Banking
Another design feature is the ability to bank permits over time periods.  The McMaster
experiments confirm the results of the two sessions reported by Carlson and Sholtz (in a slightly 
different context) that permit banking smooths prices across time periods.  We also found that
banking reduced trading efficiencies relative to trade with no banking.  This effect is eliminated,
however, when trading in shares is permitted along with banking, and when traders acquire
experience.22
Panel A in Figure 5 is a repeat of Panel A in Figure 1.  It shows permit prices in an ET3
session with no share trading and no banking.  Notice the big jump in prices when the number of
permits distributed each period is reduced in the fifth period.  Panel B of Figure 5 shows permit
prices in an ET3 session with banking, but no share trading.  There is no abrupt price increase in
period 5.  Because the reduction in permits after the fourth period is known, it is anticipated. 
Decision-makers acquire permits and bank them as necessary.  The reduction in permits after the
fourth period is reflected by higher market prices for permits during the early periods of the session
and lower prices in later periods of the session (compare the patterns of prices in Panels A and B).23
Panel B in Figure 1 shows prices when both share trading and banking are permitted. 
Compared with Panel A, prices are more stable over the course of the session and fewer trades are
made.
Design Features Interact 
Table 3 shows the effect of banking and share trading on efficiency.  No-banking sessions have less
potential for cost savings, since trade across time periods is prohibited.  After adjusting for this,
efficiency with banking but no share trading is lower than efficiency with neither banking nor share
trading.  Introducing share trading into a permit trading environment with no banking, has litte
effect on efficiency.  Share trading and banking, however, interact.  The result is a market
environment in which more than 90 percent of the potential cost savings are realized.  This is a 20
percent increase beyond what can be achieved trading permits in the periods in which they will be
used.Design Features and Production Environment Interact
It is possible that producers of pollution emissions are unable to accurately predict the amount of
emissions that will actually be produced.  If it is necessary to hold permits for emissions, or pay
fines for not having sufficient permits, the behaviour of traders in emission permit markets will be
different from that if permit needs were certain.  If there is no opportunity for banking, uncertainty
in emission control causes violent price spikes. This possibility was first demonstrated in the
laboratory in two trading sessions with uncertainty at the Experimental Laboratory for Economics
and Political Science at Caltech.  The results are reported by Carlson et al. (1993) and Carlson and
Sholtz.  Uncertainty was introduced by randomly adjusting the  subjects’ planned use of permits. 
Subjects experiencing unexpectedly high permit use were forced into a reconciliation market.  With24
no possibility of intertemporal trade, this led to very high price spikes in some periods and price
troughs in others.  Allowing staggered permits with overlapping expiry dates reduced these
fluctuations.  These results were convincing to the South Coast Air Quality Management Dirstrict
and led to the inclusion of permits with overlapping expiry dates in the Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market which was introduced in southern California in 1995.
This finding has been confirmed at McMaster.  Panel B in Figure 6 shows a reconciliation
market without banking but with share trading.  The optimal time path of permit prices in this
market is for them to rise from about 72 laboratory dollars to 130 laboratory dollars over the first
five trading periods.  Permit prices should be within the upper band shown in the diagram after the
fifth trading period.  Share trading is effective in reducing the number of trades which occur during
TABLE 3     MEAN NET (ADJUSTED NET) EFFICIENCY IN ET3 SESSIONS*
Certain Production Uncertain Production
No Share
Trading
Share Trading No Share
Trading
Share Trading
No Banking 74.84 (93.79) 76.14 (95.41) 76.22 (95.44) 79.45 (97.98)
Banking 52.02 (52.02) 90.50 (90.50) 84.37 (84.37) 93.66 (93.66)
Source: Godby, Mestelman, Muller, and Welland (1996)
* Net efficiency is the ratio of the realized cost saving to the maximum potential cost
saving with optimal banking.  Adjusted net efficiency is the ratio of the realized cost
saving to the maximum potential cost saving given that permits may or may not be
banked.25
the reconciliation portion of each trading period, but swings in permit prices are severe.  Panel A
shows a reconciliation market with both banking and share trading.  Permit prices are much more
stable (to some extent, the degree of fluctuation in permit prices in Panel B is underemphasized
because the vertical scale of Panel B is compressed relative to that of Panel A).26
Market Power Matters
It is well known that the good efficiency properties of emissions trading markets can vanish if a
dominant firm exercises its market power (see Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore).  Market power is
even more dangerous if it is exercised to raise the costs of rivals in downstream markets.
All of the laboratory markets that have been described here contain balanced distributions
of producing units (for instance, Godby et al. have a market with eight producers, four of which
have low abatement costs and four have high abatement costs; four emit half the pollution emitted
by the other four in the pre-control environment).  Brown-Kruse et al. (1995) set out to see if they
could observe market power at work in the laboratory when the industry is asymmetric.  Brown-
Kruse et al. present an experimental design in which there are ten small fringe firms and one large
dominant firm.  Subjects trade permits, then decide how much output to produce in a downstream
market.  Permits were allocated either entirely to the fringe or entirely to the dominant firm.  They
discovered that experimental subjects do exercise market power and that efficiencies can actually
be reduced below command-and-control levels when markets are vertically integrated.  The
ETC results are summarized in Table 4.  When permits are allocated to the fringe firms, the large
firm can hold the market price below the predicted competitive price giving the single buyer an
advantage in the permit market.  The reverse holds if the permits are allocated to the large firm. 
Whether there is a variable price in the product market or not, the large firm is able to exercise
market power.  Of particular note is that overall market efficiency is negative when the product
market price is variable.  This means that a command-and-control regime would lead to greater27
abatement cost savings than would result from permit trading.   The Brown-Kruse et al. results
clearly show the exercise of market power in vertically related markets.
CONCLUSIONS
Basic results 
Laboratory markets, which capture many of the characteristics of the field, support advice arising
from theoretical investigation and field research.  A good emissions trading plan will have public
information, some form of banking, and some form of secure trading in the rights to future permits
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Source: Brown-Kruse, Elliott, and Godby (1995)28
such as is provided by trading shares.  Because the rules governing permit trading matter, simply
permitting trade in permits does not guarantee that efficient markets will emerge.  Finally,
laboratory results show that concerns about market power should not be quickly dismissed.
Future Laboratory Research
Future research in this area would be fruitful.  Perhaps the most important line of research
concerns market power.  It is important to confirm the Brown-Kruse et al. results and to see
whether they stand up in different trading environments.  It may be that alternative market
institutions, such as uniform price auctions, may be effective in controlling market power. 
Experimental research may also be important in related areas of environmental regulation,
especially in testbedding alternative plans for monitoring compliance with environmental
obligations, whether implemented through tradable permits or some other means.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the Ontario Natural Gas Association for financial support through its Ontario
Environmental University Sponsorship Program.29
NOTES
1. In a uniform price auction subjects submit sealed bids from which the experimenter
generates a demand curve.  Bids are ranked and the available permits are distributed to the
highest bidders at a price somewhere between the lowest accepted and highest rejected
bids.
2. Efficiency in this context is a measure of the extent to which potential abatement cost
savings are realized through trading and banking permits.
3. This environment program presents subjects with a table whose columns are permits
redeemed and redemption value.  The current holdings of permits are flagged; thus a
subject holding eight permits in period one will believe that the marginal value of one more
permit will be given by the ninth row in the table.  But if the subject is banking optimally,
some of his current holdings will be redeemed in later periods.  Therefore, an additional
permit redeemed in the current period will not be the ninth permit but some lower
numbered permit with a higher redemption value.  This presentation will lead subjects to
undervalue current permits.
4. The proposed instruments were called shares and coupons.  Permit is a generic term and
replaces coupon and allowance in this paper.30
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